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Commentary

Through the Lens of the Sequence
Ellen Wright Clayton
Center for Genetics and Health Policy, Department of Pediatrics and School of Law, Vanderbilt University,
Nashville, Tennessee 37232, USA
The completion of the rough draft of the human genome is a scientific feat worthy of celebration. But the
media attention that has been devoted to the Human
Genome Project demonstrates that most people are not
as interested in what the sequence is as in what it
means for individuals and for society, for good or for ill.
My purpose in writing this essay is to discuss how the
project was conducted here in the United States, and
some of the implications of knowing the sequence (or
more aptly, a sequence).

The Transformative Impact of the Ethical, Legal, and
Social Implications (ELSI) Set-Aside
When James Watson declared that the Human Genome Project in the United States would set aside a
portion of the funds provided by Congress to examine
and attempt to address the ethical, legal, and social
implications of this research, he transformed the face
of biomedical research in this country. Previously, the
scientific enterprise had proceeded largely without reflection, except for the occasional proclamation that
research was inherently beneficial or at least valueneutral. People, usually those outside the scientific
community, had argued for some time and with increasing intensity that science was in fact situated in a
social context, that the questions asked by scientists
were shaped by social influences, and that the results
of research had social consequences. Many of these
commentators were particularly concerned about genetics, influenced both by the enduring dilemmas
posed by this discipline and by the unfortunate history
of eugenics here and abroad.
Watson was not writing on a clean slate when he
made his very public commitment, but he did bring
social inquiry within the inner sanctum of science by
reaching into the latter’s purse. The effect of making a
commitment to explore the implications of genome
research has been dramatic. This initiative made it
much harder for genome scientists to ignore the impact of their work, to say “leave me alone, this is science, which should be pursued solely for its own sake.”
Of perhaps broader consequence, the question within
the rest of biomedicine became not “why should we
study what this research means for people?” but rather
“why aren’t we looking at these potential conseE-MAIL ellen.w.clayton@Vanderbilt.Edu; FAX (615) 936-2783.
Article and publication are at www.genome.org/cgi/doi/10.1101/
gr.187801.

quences?” (Report of the Joint NIH/DOE Committee
2000). This transformation can be observed in the increased willingness of other federal agencies to fund
research that examines how individuals respond to
new developments in medicine and in the increased
attention paid by these agencies to addressing ethical
and social issues.
Some people have argued that the result of setting
aside federal funds for this purpose has been the neutralization of social criticism, implying that the critics
have been bought. There may be some validity to such
accusations—it is hard to bite down hard on the hand
that feeds you. But many, and probably most, of the
federally funded investigators have worked in good
faith, defining the adverse consequences that may attend a greater understanding of genetics, even if only
as the first step toward developing strategies to limit
these hazards. The debates about genetic privacy and
discrimination and the numerous studies of how
people respond to genetic testing are just two examples. It is worth noting that plenty of people are still
highly critical of genomics, seeing the whole endeavor
as one in which the risks far outweigh any potential
gains. One need only look to the writings of Jeremy
Rifkin (1984) and the uproar over genetically modified
foods here and especially abroad to get a taste of the
passion invested in these issues. If the goal of establishing the ELSI Program of the Human Genome
Project had been to silence dissent and to permit only
uncritical boosterism, which happily it was not, then it
would be a spectacular failure. The result of the provision of federal funds for research into the impact of
genomics has, instead, been to invite fuller, more informed, and often heated debate.

The Effects of Genomics on Biomedical Research and
Health Care Delivery
Apart from the process by which the draft was obtained, what can one say about the social impact of
having decoded the human sequence? The first place
to look is within biomedicine itself. Everyone would
agree that having access to the sequence is a profoundly powerful tool for understanding the pathogenesis of disease. The ability to identify candidate
genes, to hypothesize about their function by identifying the family of genes to which they belong, and to
identify the same or similar genes in other organisms
that permit in vivo experimentation has greatly accel-
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erated the pace of research. As dramatic as these advances have been, however, far more remains to be
learned about how genes affect human health. The
challenges are even more daunting when one looks
beyond the effects of single genes. Little is known
about which genes contribute to the appearance of
multifactorial, complex phenotypes. Still less is understood about how genes are regulated and about how
systems function. Learning how these complex processes operate will require a level of information management that would have been impossible even 10
years ago and for most of us is unimaginable even now.
Indeed, the genomics revolution is completely dependent on the other great revolution of our time, the
emergence of the information age. To top it all off, as
fledgling as our understanding of how genes contribute to disease is, that knowledge far outstrips our ability to prevent or treat these disorders.
The vastness of the not yet known and the gap
between understanding and intervention are not
unique to genomics. Physicians often know a lot more
about what is wrong with a patient than they do about
what to do about it. Nonetheless, genomics does present some dilemmas that go beyond those characterizing medicine in general. One of the larger challenges
surrounds testing per se, particularly for screening
asymptomatic individuals. Physicians do all sorts of
tests for diagnostic and predictive purposes. Think, for
example, of routine cholesterol screening, Pap smears,
and mammograms, to name only a few. Despite the
ethical requirement that clinicians discuss options
with patients, who then decide for themselves whether
or not to proceed, and the well-documented adverse
consequences of false-positive test results, such tests
typically are performed without a great deal of thought
or conversation by the clinician or much consideration
by the patient.
Rarely a week goes by without a call in the newspapers or medical journals to screen people for mutations in a newly identified gene. Such proposals to incorporate predictive genetic testing into medical practice, however, usually are not enthusiastically
embraced, but rather are met (appropriately) with hesitation and with recommendations for further research
to determine how best to proceed. This laudable caution has been observed for a number of tests, including
cystic fibrosis carrier testing and testing for mutations
in BRCA1, HNPCC, and hereditary hemochromatosis
genes. In addition, two national bodies, the NIH-DOE
Task Force on Genetic Testing and the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing, have developed
more general procedural and substantive requirements
that should be satisfied before genetic tests are implemented in practice (Task Force on Genetic Testing
1997; Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on
Genetic Testing 2000). One can speculate about why
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the professional and public response to genetic testing
has been so much more restrained than it has been for
other medical developments; contributing factors
doubtless include the givenness of one’s genetic
makeup, fears about discrimination, the history of eugenics in the West, and the inextricable link between
genetic information and reproductive testing and the
potential desire to interfere with procreation. Whatever the reasons, the result is an approach to testing
that increasingly is seen as a paradigm for the rest of
medicine. This call for more empirical data and interpersonal reflection, however, does itself present additional challenges.
The first dilemma is the challenge of ensuring that
patients understand the implications of genetic testing
so that they can make informed decisions for themselves according to their own values about whether or
not to proceed. As Jay Katz so eloquently demonstrated
years ago in his book The Silent World of Doctor and
Patient (Katz 1984), truly enabling patients to make
their own choices is extremely difficult and probably
would require a radical transformation of the practice
of medicine. We have made little progress toward
achieving this sort of shared decision making, even
though it is relatively easy to understand the need to
think about obtaining informed consent for invasive
therapeutic interventions because these are unusual
events in the lives of patients: Most people have vivid
memories of surgeries and invasive radiologic procedures. By contrast, it will take even more to overcome
the routinization of the simple blood test in the minds
of both clinicians and patients.
A second question is whether society is truly committed to permitting people to proceed according to
their own lights. The worry is not primarily that people
will be forced or given incentives to accept therapy
they do not want, although that is certainly possible.
Instead, it is whether third-party payers will cover tests
that people desire to obtain information about their
risks or to justify seeking expensive and perhaps not
demonstrably efficacious preventive interventions
such as prophylactic surgery. Will a third-party payer
actually be willing to spend $2000 for a test to resolve
a person’s uncertainty? More to the point, because all
of us ultimately bear the cost of health care, will you be
willing to pay higher premiums or higher taxes or to
receive smaller paychecks so that your employer can
fund premiums that enable your neighbor to have an
expensive test merely to allay his worries? Doubtless
most people will try to use genetic information to improve their own health, but the goals and the costs of
the health care payment and delivery systems will be
challenged to the extent that individuals seek this information for other reasons.
One of the most pervasive concerns raised about
genetic testing is the fear that the results will be used to
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deny access to health insurance. It is important to acknowledge that most people are not at immediate risk
of losing their coverage if they find that they have a
predisposing mutation because most people have coverage through their employer or a government program such as Medicaid or Medicare. Moreover, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(1996) made it somewhat easier for people to change
jobs without losing their coverage or to enter the private insurance market. Nonetheless, to the extent that
people need to purchase individual coverage, they
rightly fear any test results that indicate that they may
become ill in the future. In addition, the numerous
efforts at both the state and federal levels to limit the
use of genetic information in insurance underwriting
demonstrate the difficulty of the task, due in no small
part to the problems of deciding what is genetic and
what is not. Legislatures have learned that simply prohibiting access to the results of DNA tests does not
protect patients (Reilly 1997). DNA-based tests are still
relatively uncommon, and in any event, a woman’s
family history of having numerous relatives with early
onset breast and ovarian cancer reveals almost as
much, if not more, about her risk of future disease as
do her own test results for mutations in BRCA1. In fact,
she could be mutation-negative but still at elevated risk
if the cancers in her family were caused by mutations
in a different gene or by environmental exposure. But
if one excludes every health characteristic that is potentially influenced by genes from insurance underwriting, little risk information would remain for sellers
of insurance to use, leaving them with the need to
assume that everyone will suffer from an expensive
illness in the near future. The whole debate surrounding genetic discrimination in access to health insurance demonstrates that the real question is not
whether genetic information is somehow different
from other information. Instead, the fundamental issue is whether health care coverage should be a matter
of private business or employment benefit, as it is at
present, or is something to which all people should be
entitled as part of the social contract.
The social ramifications of genomics reach beyond
the predictive and diagnostic to the therapeutic. At
present, for example, pharmacogenomics is all the
rage. The air is full of promises of targeted therapy,
evoking images of a time when a test performed by
using a simple chip will permit patients to get treatments that are more effective with fewer side effects. In
theory, targeted intervention makes sense, and precedents exist for tailoring treatment. Clinicians determine antibiotic sensitivity of infectious organisms and
evaluate malignancies for certain predictive characteristics; these characteristics are often caused by mutations, albeit sometimes acquired. Nonetheless, it is not
yet clear whether developing targeted interventions for

more common multifactorial disorders will be economically viable, and if so, how widely they will be
made available. The first is a matter of whether the
pharmaceutical industry believes there will be a big
enough market to warrant the investment, particularly
because tailoring therapy necessarily means fewer patients for any particular drug, and whether third-party
payers are willing to pay the higher prices that doubtless will follow. The probable limitation of the benefits
of pharmacogenomics to the fortunate few will exacerbate the problems of justice that already run
throughout our health care system, in which many
patients have access only to limited formularies, the
contents of which are driven at least in part by the
payer’s ability to obtain a good price from a particular
company.
A related issue that affects the future impact of
genomics is the heated debate about gene patenting.
Patents pervade health care delivery. Certainly the
prospect of making money is a powerful driver of innovation, and virtually everyone would agree that the
technology we have at present is the result of this incentive. Nonetheless several factors contribute to the
air of concern that surrounds patenting genes. One is
the enormous public investment that has gone into
the Human Genome Project with its very public commitment of making the sequence available to everyone, literally on the day the sequence is deciphered.
Patents privatize the products of this public investment. The government has been encouraging individuals, universities, and other entities to move the
products of publicly funded research into the private
sector ever since the enactment of Bayh-Dole (BayhDole Act 2000). The theory is that encouraging privatization and providing patent protection will ensure
that the fruits of public research are made available for
the care of patients, which after all was the primary
reason for doing the research in the first place, but the
transfer of the products of public money into private
hands is becoming more and more obvious and
troublesome.
Another source of disquiet about patents is the
necessary involvement of particular patients in the discovery of disease genes; one cannot find a gene without access to DNA and phenotypic information from
affected and unaffected individuals. Independent of
the question of whether genes ought to be patentable
at all or whether individuals whose DNA is used in this
type of research should have some economic stake in
the resulting products, patient–subjects and their families are growing more vocal about being “used”. They
complain that they participate in this type of research
only to find that they are unable to obtain testing because some investigator or institution exercises patent
rights. Dr. Judith Tsipis, speaking as a consumer on
behalf of the National Tay-Sachs and Allied Diseases
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Association, made this point eloquently in her testimony last June before the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing regarding the limited availability of testing for Canavan disease (Highlights of the
Fifth Meeting of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee
on Genetic Testing 2000). Concerns about limited access are likely to be even more acute for very rare disorders where the presence of patents, coupled with the
burden of complying with the requirements of the
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act (CLIA), may
mean that tests are never made available at all (Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 [CLIA]
2000). These problems are not unique to genetics—
pharmaceutical and other products have to be validated with patients, rare diseases are frequently orphaned, and products will not be brought to market
without the prospect of financial gain—but the dawning public recognition that being a research subject
does not ensure access to the benefits of what is
learned, especially when the researchers and commercial entities obtain substantial financial gains, may decrease subjects’ willingness to participate. In the end, it
may be necessary to reconsider the package of rights
that currently accompany gene patents, perhaps moving to require licensing with statutorily-defined limits
on the fees.

The Implications of Genomics for Other Social
Institutions and Fundamental Beliefs
Greater understanding of genetics can also affect the
way people regard themselves and others. The central
nightmare is the specter of genetic determinism, which
in its most extreme form asserts that people are entirely
the product of their genes. Some of the metaphors currently applied to the human genome (the “book of
life” being a prime example) foster this vision. A moment’s thought reveals that this extreme position cannot be valid—even identical twins raised together differ from each other—but it is equally clear that genes
do contribute to the individual’s ultimate phenotype.
The fact that most genes appear to be expressed only in
the central nervous system suggests that even behavior
is influenced by genes. The contribution of genes to
function should lead us to ask two related, but separate, questions. The first is how to establish the roles
that genes and environment play in the appearance of
complex traits, a topic I leave to others.
The more important dilemma is deciding how we
individually and as a society should respond to a
greater understanding of the contributions of genes to
human function. The social implications of knowing
more about what genes do are potentially profound, in
some instances going right to the heart of beliefs about
personal responsibility, a conundrum that has occupied philosophers and theologians for millennia. A
growing number of criminal defendants, for example,
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seek to avoid or decrease their punishment by arguing,
“my genes made me do it.” Our society is based on the
premise that people should be responsible for their
own actions. The criminal justice system and society in
general have always had a hard time dealing with the
notion that people with certain characteristics, such as
insanity, youth, or mental retardation, can be excused
from criminal responsibility for acts that harm others.
The public often responds with outrage when a murderer successfully pleads insanity or is sent to juvenile
court. Nonetheless, the existence of these defenses is
based on a deeply held sense that people must have
certain cognitive capacities before they can be subjected to the full penalties of the law. Efforts to assert
genetic defenses will confront this tension between desires for retribution and deterrence and the nagging
sense that certain people should not be held responsible for their acts.
The fact that this defense is allegedly based on science creates further reason for disquiet. Courts have for
a long time struggled with the fear that triers of fact
tend to see scientific evidence as particularly trustworthy, a reliance that is not always warranted. In a number of recent cases, criminal defense attorneys have
sought to introduce evidence of family histories of violence or assays of monoamine oxidase levels, asserting
their relevance to establishing genetic causes of the
defendants’ actions (Friedland 1997/98). The lawyers
who pursue these strategies do so because they are obligated by canons of legal ethics to present the best
possible defense for their clients. These attorneys often
are also motivated by opposition to the death penalty
and by beliefs that the criminal justice system is unfair
in a number of ways. These socially appropriate reasons, however, do little to allay the concerns of those
who believe that very little is known about genetic
contributions to criminal behavior and who squirm at
the use of what they see as pseudo-science.
Another fundamental issue that will arise from
greater understanding of genetics is whether genetic
differences will be seen as justification for treating
some people less well than others. Using genetics to
justify bigotry already occurs on the World Wide Web
on the home pages of present-day eugenicists and
white supremacists. Sadly, this is hardly surprising. A
major theme of human history is individual and group
desires to prove their “innate” superiority over others.
Some people might even argue that this competitiveness is ingrained in humanity as a result of the evolutionary process.
Nonetheless, the social consequences of learning
about what genes do are not preordained but rather are
within our control. The history of employment discrimination law in the United States illustrates the potential to shape social responses. In the past, society
passed laws forbidding discrimination on the basis of
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such factors as race, ethnicity, gender, pregnancy, age,
and disability. Employers may well prefer to hire
whomever they wish, but our lawmakers have chosen
to mandate instead that some of the characteristics
that differentiate us either should be irrelevant to employment (gender and race being good examples) or
are simply costs that must be borne to level the playing
field and to create the kind of inclusive society we want
to live in, such as when accommodations must be
made to permit individuals with physical disabilities to
work.
Greater understanding of the contribution of
genes to disease will present challenges such as these in
almost every aspect of social life, ranging from employment, to education, to access to financial resources
such as mortgages and life insurance. Should public
transportation officials be permitted to fire employees
who have mutations in the gene for Huntington disease, or should these agencies be required to rely instead on routine performance evaluations that would
detect neurological problems before they cause any
threat to the public? The central dilemma here is
whether and when it is the genotype or the phenotype
that matters. Regulatory bodies are already considering
other questions about the use of genetic information
in employment. Terri Seargent recently successfully asserted that her employer had fired her unlawfully because she was diagnosed with alpha-a-antitrypsin deficiency and, although asymptomatic, required expensive medication (Genetic Disease Organization 2000).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission this
year filed a suit to prevent a major railroad from performing DNA-based tests on its workers to see if they
were predisposed to develop carpal tunnel syndrome
(Lewin 2001).
Problems in other arenas might be presented were
a child known to have familial hypercholesterolemia, a
disease that almost always causes early mortality.
Would it be appropriate for a college to deny her admission on the grounds that she would not live long
enough to get any benefit from it? What about allowing her to matriculate but denying her financial aid?
What if her parents decided not to invest in her education, but rather to send their other, unaffected child
to school? Although all of the decisions affecting the
life of the child with hypercholesterolemia might be
viewed as troubling, our society is more likely to regulate the actions of the college than those of the parents.
The deference for the latter is in keeping with widely
held views of the family as relatively autonomous.
These questions evoke visions of Gattaca, a movie
set in the near future in which the prediction (rendered
within seconds of the protagonist’s birth) that he was
at risk for neurological disease, manic depressive disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and heart
disease, and had a life expectancy of 30.2 years meant

that he was shunted into a life as a janitor. The plot of
the movie, of course, is that our hero was able to triumph over this nightmare of genetic discrimination
run rampant by adopting someone else’s genetic identity. It did not hurt the course of the movie that the
predictions of his disability and death were not accurate either, but clinicians know that that is the nature
of prognostication.
In deciding how to respond to the geneattributable differences among us, we do not have the
luxury of simply banning genetic discrimination. Our
society values the ability to excel in any number of
areas that are influenced by genes. One would be hard
pressed to say that the National Basketball Association
should exclude someone like Michael Jordan in favor
of someone with little or no athletic ability or that
airlines should be forced to hire a pilot who has a genetically based, poorly controlled arrhythmia that predisposes him to sudden death. Instead the challenge is,
as it has always been, to decide which differences
should make a difference. Confronting the implications of genetics requires consideration of fundamental notions of justice and of the type of society we
desire.
The most far-reaching effects of having the rough
draft of the human genome sequence, as well as that of
other organisms, are what the sequence says for the
role of human beings in the larger scheme of life. The
extraordinary homology among the genes of different
organisms is, of course, great news for biomedical research. If other animals had completely different genomes from ours, it would be impossible to extrapolate
results from these organisms to the human. The extent
of the observed homologies is also the most powerful
evidence available against the rather surprising reemergence of those who would require the teaching of creation science to our children, sometimes to the exclusion of the theory of evolution (Johnson 1995).
Even more remarkable are the facts that all humans share >99.9% of their sequence, that all humanity is descended from a single group of founders, that
more sequence variation exists within ethnic groups
than between them, and that race does not exist as a
genetic entity (or, put another way, that there are no
genes for “race”). These facts are powerful evidence of
the unity of humanity. One can only hope that a way
can be found to use this new understanding to reduce
the ethnic hatred that afflicts the world. It would be
sweet indeed if the world were brought closer together
by the double helix.
The growing understanding of genomics affects
society in other ways that have not been addressed in
this essay, but enough has already been discussed to
make the point clear. Seeing the world through the
lens of genetics has the power to change how we regard
one another, how we think about such fundamental
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precepts as justice, and how we understand ourselves
and our own actions. The challenge, acknowledged by
James Watson more than a decade ago and enthusiastically embraced by Francis Collins in his support for
the ELSI Program of the National Human Genome Research Institute and by Ari Patrinos in the Department
of Energy, is to keep what we see through this lens in
perspective and to try as best we can to ensure that this
powerful knowledge is used to benefit all people.
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